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Abstract
The current analysis in the AI safety literature usually com-
bines a risk or safety issue (e.g., interruptibility) with a partic-
ular paradigm for an AI agent (e.g., reinforcement learning).
However, there is currently no survey of safety-relevant char-
acteristics of AI systems that may reveal neglected areas of
research or suggest to developers what design choices they
could make to avoid or minimise certain safety concerns. In
this paper, we take a first step towards delivering such a sur-
vey, from two angles. The first features AI system characteris-
tics that are already known to be relevant to safety concerns,
including internal system characteristics, characteristics re-
lating to the effect of the external environment on the sys-
tem, and characteristics relating to the effect of the system on
the target environment. The second presents a brief survey of
a broad range of AI system characteristics that could prove
relevant to safety research, including types of interaction,
computation, integration, anticipation, supervision, modifica-
tion, motivation and achievement. This survey enables further
work in exploring system characteristics and design choices
that affect safety concerns.
Introduction
AI Safety is concerned with all possible dangers and harm-
ful effects that may be associated with AI. While landmark
research in the field had to focus on specific AI system
designs, paradigms or capability levels to explore a range
of safety concerns (Bostrom 2014; Amodei et al. 2016;
Leike et al. 2017; Yampolskiy 2016; Everitt, Lea, and Hut-
ter 2018), as the field matures so the need arises to explore
a broader range of AI system designs, and survey the rel-
evance of different characteristics of AI systems to safety
concerns. The aim of such research is two-fold: the first, to
identify the effects of less-explored characteristics or less-
fashionable paradigms on safety concerns; the second, to in-
crease awareness among AI developers that design choices
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can have consequences for safety, and potentially highlight
choices that can eliminate or minimise safety risks.
In this paper we propose a two-pronged approach towards
a survey of safety-relevant AI characteristics. The first ex-
tracts from existing work on AI safety key characteristics
that are known, or strongly suspected to be, safety-relevant.
These are explored under three headings: internal charac-
teristics, or characteristics of the AI system itself (e.g. inter-
pretability); effect of the external environment on the system
(e.g. the ability of the operator to intervene during opera-
tion); and effect of the system on the external environment
(e.g. whether the system influences a safety-critical setting).
The second approach surveys a wide range of character-
istics from different paradigms, including cybernetics, ma-
chine learning and safety engineering, and provides an early
account of their potential relevance to safety concerns, as a
guide for future work. These characteristics are grouped un-
der types of interaction, computation, integration, anticipa-
tion, supervision, modification, motivation and achievement.
Known Safety-relevant Characteristics
In this section we break down a range of characteristics of
AI systems that link to AI safety-relevant challenges. These
are grouped by three categories: Characteristics of an AI
system that are internal to the system; Characteristics of an
AI system that involve input from the external environment;
Characteristics that relate to an AI system’s influence on its
external environment. We limit the discussion to the safety
challenges that can stem from failures of design, specifica-
tion or behaviour of the AI system, rather than the malicious
or careless1 use of a correctly-functioning system (Brundage
et al. 2018).
1A key component of safety is the education and training of
human operators and the general public, as happens with tools and
machinery, but this is extrinsic to the system (e.g., a translation
mistake in a manual can lead to misuse of an AI system).
Internal characteristics
• Goal and behaviour scrutability and interpretability:
Are goals and subgoals identifiable and ultimately ex-
plainable? Is behaviour predictable and scrutable? Are
system internal states interpretable? Do the above come
from rules or are they inferred from data? While be-
haviour and goal “creativity” can lead to greater bene-
fits, and uninterpretable architectures may achieve higher
performance scores or be faster to develop, these puta-
tive advantages trade off against increased safety risk.
Characteristics that can increase scrutability and inter-
pretability include, e.g., separation and encapsulation
of sub-components, restricted exploration/behavioural
range, systems restricted to human-intelligible concepts,
rules or behaviours, and systems that are accompanied by
specifically designed interpreters or explainability tools.
• Persistence: Does a system persist in its environment
and operate without being reset for long periods of time?
While persistence can have benefits in terms of, e.g.,
longer-term yields from exploration or detection of long-
term temporal patterns, it also allows the system more
time to drift from design specifications, encounter distri-
butional shifts, experience failures of sub-components, or
execute long-term strategies overlooked by an operator.
• Existence and richness of self-model: Does a system
have a model of itself which would allow it to predict
the consequences of modifying its own goals, body or
behaviour? Model-based systems, embodied systems or
systems with a rich representational capacity may have
or develop a model of themselves in the environment. By
making itself a part of the environment, the system can
then conceptualise and execute plans that involve mod-
ifications to itself, which can lead to a range of safety
concerns. In addition, self-models create the possibility
of mismatches between the self-model and reality, which
could be a particular safety concern. Characteristics that
influence the existence and richness of a self-model in-
clude the architecture of the system, its information rep-
resentation capacity, and its input and output channels.
• Disposition to self-modify: Is a system designed such
that it can modify its own sub-goals, behaviour or capabil-
ities in the pursuit of an overall goal (Omohundro 2008)?
The existence of such a disposition, which may arise for
any long-term planner in a sufficiently open environment,
raises significant safety concerns by creating an adversar-
ial relationship between the system (which aims to self-
modify) and its operator (which aims to avoid modifica-
tions with their associated safety concerns).
Effect of the external environment on the system
• Adaptation through feedback: Does a system have the
ability to update its behaviour in response to feedback
from its environment based on its actions? Feedback is
an essential tool, under certain paradigms, for creating
systems with appropriate complex behaviour (e.g. reward
in reinforcement learning, fitness in evolutionary meth-
ods). However the system could also pick up feedback
from side channels; e.g., a behaviour could unintention-
ally grant access to more computing power, improving
the system’s performance on a key metric, and thus re-
inforcing resource acquisition. This could reinforce self-
modification or other unsafe behaviour, or cause increas-
ing drift from intended behaviour and goals.
• Access to self/reward system through the environment:
Can a system modify its own code in response to inputs
from the environment, or in the case of reinforcement
learning systems, modify the reward generating system?
If the system’s range of possible actions includes mak-
ing modifications to its own components or to the reward
generation system, this could lead to unexpected and dan-
gerous behaviour (Everitt and Hutter 2018).
• Access to input/output (I/O) channels: Can the system
change the number, performance or nature of its I/O chan-
nels and actuators? This may lead to the emergence of
behaviours such as self-deception (through manipulation
of inputs), unexpected change in power (through manipu-
lation of actuators), or other behaviours that could rep-
resent safety concerns. When the system has access to
modify its I/O channels, both I/O channels and system
behaviours are in flux as they respond to changes in the
other; as a result, system behaviour may become unpre-
dictable (Garrabrant and Demski 2018).
• Ability of operator to intervene during operations:
Does the system, during its intended use setting, allow an
operator to intervene and halt operations (interruptablity),
modify the system, or update its goals (corrigibitily)? Is
the system built in a way that it cooperates with inter-
ventions from its designer or user even when these in-
terventions conflict with pursuit of a system’s goals; for
instance, if the designer sends a signal to shut down the
system (Soares et al. 2015)? Relevant sub-characteristics
here include the system being modifiable by the operator
during deployment, fail-safe behaviour of the system in
case of emergency halting, and the goals of the system
being such that they support, or at least do not contradict,
operator interventions.
Effect of the system on the external environment
• Embodiment: Does the system have actuators (e.g. a
robotic hand or access to car steering) that allow it to have
physical impacts in the world (Garrabrant and Demski
2018)? The potential for physical harm is trivially related
to the physical properties of a system, though it should be
noted that unpredictable deliberate behaviour could lead
to unexpected effects from otherwise familiar physical
artefacts; e.g., intelligent use of items in the environment
as tools to increase a system’s physical impact.
• System required for preventing harm: If the system
is being relied on to prevent harm, any potential failure
requires an effective fail-safe mechanism and available
redundancy capacity in order to avoid harm (Gasparik,
Gamble, and Gao 2018). This includes AI that is directly
or indirectly connected to critical systems, e.g., an energy
grid or a traffic light network. As such critical systems
are becoming increasingly digitised, networked, and com-
plex, there are increasing incentives to introduce AI com-
ponents into various parts of these systems, with associ-
ated safety risks.
Potentially safety-relevant characteristics
In this section, we systematically explore a broader range
of system characteristics that may be relevant in the con-
text of AI safety. Many of the safety-relevant character-
istics identified above have clear links to elements within
the broader mapping provided below. Nonetheless, we be-
lieve separating the two surveys is valuable, as the above re-
lates to action-guiding information about system design and
evaluation, whereas the following aims at a broader explo-
ration that may enable future AI safety research. The fol-
lowing subsections draw on work from different areas, in-
cluding the early days of cybernetics, more modern areas
such as machine learning, and the literature on safety engi-
neering for other kinds of systems. The following list inte-
grates and expands on characteristics identified in these dif-
ferent literatures. We consider characteristics that are intrin-
sically causally related to AI safety. Otherwise every prop-
erty should be in the list (e.g., the price of an AI system may
be co-related with safety, but it is not an intrinsic cause of its
safety). Notwithstanding this scope, we do not claim that our
list is exhaustive. Enumerations will be used for alternative
cases for a characteristic, while unnumbered bullets will be
used for sub-characteristics in each of the subsections.
Types of interaction
Inputs go from environment to system and outputs go from
system to environment. Depending on the existence of inputs
and/or outputs, systems can be categorised into:
1. NINO (No inputs, no outputs). The system is formally iso-
lated. While this situation may seem completely safe (and
largely uninteresting), even here safety issues may arise
if, e.g., an isolated artificial life simulator could evolve a
descendent system that eventually could break out of its
simulation, feel pain or simulate suffering.
2. NIWO (No inputs, with outputs): The system or mod-
ule can output a log, or is simply observed from outside.
Again, the system itself may malfunction; e.g., an ad-
vanced prime number generator could give incorrect out-
puts. The system could also provide an output that influ-
ences the observer; e.g., an automated philosopher could
output convincing arguments for suicide.
3. WINO (With inputs, no outputs): This would be similar to
case 1, but access to a much richer source could ultimately
give insights to the system about its constrained artificial
environment. For instance, a Plato-cavern system watch-
ing TV may learn that it is in a simulated environment,
encouraging it to seek access to the outside world.
4. WIWO (With inputs and outputs): Most AI systems, and
most systems generally, fall under this category.
Systems that limit inputs and/or outputs in various ways
have been explored under the term AI “boxing” or “con-
tainment” (Babcock, Krama´r, and Yampolskiy 2016), and
further refinements exist with additional categories; for ex-
ample, exploring censoring of inputs and outputs, leading to
nine categories (Yampolskiy 2012). Nevertheless, because
of the range of systems and potential impact of WIWO sys-
tems, this category requires further detail in terms of syn-
chrony:
1. Alternating (A): Inputs and outputs alternate, irrespective
of the passage of time.
2. Synchronous (S): Inputs and outputs are exchanged at reg-
ular intervals (e.g., each 5 ms), so real-time issues and
computational resources become relevant.
3. Asynchronous Reactive (R): Information can only be
transmitted or actions can only be made when the peer
has finished their “message” or action.
4. Asynchronously Proactive (P): Information/actions can
flow at any point in any direction.
More restricted I/O characteristics, such as SIPO or RIPO,
may appear safer, but this intuition requires deeper analysis.
Note that most research in AI safety on RL systems con-
sider the alternating case (AIAO), but issues may become
more complex for the PIPO case (continuous reinforcement
learning), which is the situation in the real world for animals
and may be expected for robotic and other AI systems.
Under this view, the common view of an “oracle” in the
AI literature (Armstrong 2017) can have several incarna-
tions, even following the definition of “no actions besides
answering questions” (Babcock, Krama´r, and Yampolskiy
2016; Armstrong 2017; Yampolskiy 2012). Some solutions
are proposed in terms of decoupling output from rewards
or limiting the quantity of information, but other options in
terms of the frequency of the exchange of information re-
main to be explored.
Types of computation
This is perhaps the characteristic that is best-known in com-
puter science, where a system can be Turing-complete or can
be restricted to some other classes with limited expressive-
ness. There are countless hierarchies for different models of
computations; the most famous is based on classes of au-
tomata. We will just describe three levels here:
1. Non Turing-complete: The interaction that the system
presents to the environment is not Turing-complete. Many
AI systems are not Turing-complete.
2. Turing-complete: The interaction allows the calculation
of any possible effective function between inputs and out-
puts.
3. Other models of computation: This includes, for exam-
ple, quantum computing, which in some instances may be
a faster traditional model, while in others may have prob-
abilistic Turing power (Bernstein and Vazirani 1997).
Note that this is not about the programming language the
system is implemented in (e.g., a very simple thermostat
can be written in Java, which is Turing-complete), but about
whether the system allows for a Turing-complete mapping
between inputs and outputs, i.e., any computable function
could ultimately be calculated on the environment using the
system. Finally, a system can be originally Turing-complete,
but can eventually lose this universality after some inputs or
interactions (Barmpalias and Dowe 2012).
It is important to distinguish between function approxi-
mation and function identification. Many machine learning
models (e.g., neural networks) are said to be able to approx-
imate any computable function, but feedforward neural net-
works do not have loops or recursion, so technically they
are not Turing-complete. Turing-completeness comes with
the problems of termination, an important safety hazard in
some situations, and a recurrent issue in software verifica-
tion (D’silva, Kroening, and Weissenbacher 2008). For in-
stance, an AI planner could enter an infinite loop trying to
solve a problem, commanding ever-greater resources while
doing so. On the other hand, one can limit the expressiveness
of the language or bound the computations, but that would
limit the tasks a system is able to undertake.
Types of integration
No system is fully isolated from the world. Interference may
occur at all levels, from neutrinos penetrating the system to
earthquakes shaking it. Here, we seek to identify all the el-
ements that create a causal pathway from the outside world
to the system, including its physical character, resources, lo-
cation, and the degree of coupling with other systems.
• Resources: The most universal external resource is en-
ergy, which is why many critical systems are devised with
internal generators or batteries, especially for the situa-
tions where the external source fails. In AI, other common
dependencies include data, knowledge, software, hard-
ware, human manipulation, computing resources, net-
work, calendar time, etc. While some of these are of-
ten neglected when evaluating the performance of an AI
system (Martı´nez-Plumed et al. 2018a), the analysis for
safety must necessarily include all these dependencies.
For instance, a system that requires external real-time in-
formation (e.g., a GPS location) may fail through loss of
access to this resource.
• Social coupling: Sometimes it is hard to determine where
a system starts and ends, due to the nature of its inter-
action with humans and other systems. The boundary of
where human cognition ends and where it is assisted, ex-
tended or supported by AI (Ford et al. 2015) is blurred, as
is the boundary between computations carried out within
an AI system versus in the environment or by other agents,
as illustrated by the phenomenon of human computation
(Quinn and Bederson 2011).
• Distribution: Another way of looking at integration is
in terms of distribution, which is also an important facet
of analysis in AI (Martınez-Plumed et al. 2018b). Today,
through the overall use of network connectivity and “the
cloud”, many systems are distributed in terms of hard-
ware, software, data and compute. Under this trend, only
systems embedded in critical and military applications
are devised to be as self-contained as possible. Neverthe-
less, distribution and redundancy are also common ways
of achieving robustness (Coulouris, Dollimore, and Kind-
berg 2011), most notably in information systems. For in-
stance, swarm intelligence and swarm robotics are often
claimed to be more robust (Bonabeau et al. 1999), at the
cost of being less controllable than centralised systems.
Types of anticipation
In some areas of AI there is a distinction between model-
based and model-free systems (Geffner 2018). Model-free
systems choose actions according to some reinforced pat-
terns or strengthened feature connections. Model-based sys-
tems evaluate actions according to some pre-existing or
learned models and choose the action that gets the best re-
sults in the simulation. The line between model-based and
model-free is subtle, but we can identify several levels:
1. Model-free: Despite having no model, these systems can
achieve excellent performance. For instance, DQN can
achieve high scores (Mnih 2015), but cannot anticipate
whether an action can lead to a particular situation that
is considered especially unsafe or dangerous; e.g., one in
which the player is killed.
2. Model of the world: A system with a model of its environ-
ment can use planning to determine the effect of its own
actions. For instance, without a model of physics, a sys-
tem will hardly tell whether it will break something or will
engage in “safe exploration” (Pecka and Svoboda 2014;
Turchetta, Berkenkamp, and Krause 2016). This is espe-
cially critical during exploitation: are actions reversible or
of low impact (Armstrong and Levinstein 2017)?
3. Model of the body: Some systems can have a good ac-
count of the environment but a limited understanding of
their own physical actuators, potentially self-harming or
harming others; for example, failing to simulate the effect
of moving a heavy robotic arm in a given direction.
4. Social models, model of other agents: Seeing other agents
as merely physical objects, or not modelling them at all,
is very limiting in social situations. A naive theory of
mind, including the beliefs, desires and intentions of other
agents, can help anticipate what others will do, think or
feel, and may be crucial for safe AI systems interacting
with people and other agents but may increase a system’s
capacity for deception or manipulation.
5. Model of one’s mind: Finally, a system may be able to
model other agents well, but may not be able to use this
capability to model itself. When this meta-cognition is
present, the system has knowledge about its own capabil-
ities and limitations, which may be very helpful for safety
in advanced systems, but may also lead to some degree of
self-awareness. This may result, in some cases, in antiso-
cial or suicidal behaviours.
The use of models may dramatically expand safety-relevant
characteristics, e.g., by conferring the ability to simulate and
evaluate scenarios through causal and counterfactual reason-
ing. This therefore represents an important set of considera-
tions for future AI systems.
Types of supervision
Supervision is a way of checking and correcting the be-
haviour of a system through observation or interaction, and
hence it is crucial for safety. Supervision can be in the form
of corrected values for predictive models such as classifi-
cation or regression, but it can also be partial (the answer
is wrong, but the right answer is not given). Supervision can
also be much more subtle than this. For instance, a diagnosis
assistant that suggests a possible diagnosis to a doctor can be
designed to get no feedback once deployed. However, some
kinds of feedback can still reach the system in terms of the
distribution or frequency of tasks (questions), or through the
way the tasks are posed to the system.
Consequently there are several degrees and qualities of
supervision, and this may depend on the system. For in-
stance, in classification, one can have data for all examples
or just for a few (known as semi-supervised learning). In re-
inforcement learning, one can have sparse versus dense re-
ward. In general, supervision can come in many different
ways, according to some criteria:
• Completeness: Supervision can be very partial (sig-
nalling incorrectness), more informative (showing the
correct way) or complete (showing all positive and neg-
ative ways of behaving in the environment).
• Procedurality: Beyond what is right and wrong, feedback
can be limited about the result or can show the whole pro-
cess, as in the case of learning by demonstration.
• Density: Supervision can be sparse or dense. Of course
the denser the better (but more expensive), and the less
autonomous the system is considered.
• Adaptiveness: Supervision can be ‘intelligent’ as well,
which happens in machine teaching situations when ex-
amples or interactions are chosen such that the system
reaches the desired behaviour as soon as possible.
• Responsiveness: In areas such as query learning or active
learning, the system can ask questions or undertake ex-
periments at any time. The results can come in real time
or may have a delay or be given in batches.
For many systems, supervision can have a dedicated chan-
nel (e.g., rewards in RL) but for others it can be performed
by modification of the environment (e.g., moving objects or
smiling), even to the extent that the system is unaware these
changes have a guiding purpose (e.g., clues).
Types of modification
Some of the most recurrent issues in AI safety – including
many covered in the section about known AI safety charac-
teristics – are related to ways in which the system can be
modified. This includes issues such as wire-heading or algo-
rithmic self-improvement. Here, in the first place, we have
to distinguish between whether the system can be modified
by the environment, or by the system itself. Modifications
by the environment can be intentional (and hence related to
supervision), but they can also be unintentional (code cor-
ruption from external sources). Even a system whose core
code cannot be modified by an external source, may be af-
fected in state or code by regular inputs, physical equipment
and other parts. So it is better to explore different ways and
degrees to which a system can be modified externally:
• Interruptible: The system has a switch-off command or
modification option to switch it off.
• Parametric modification: Many systems are regulated or
calibrated with parameters or weights. When these param-
eters have a clear relation to the behaviour of a system
(e.g., an intelligent thermostat), this can be an effective,
bounded and simple way of modifying the system.
• Algorithmic modification: This can include new func-
tionalities, bug fixes, updates, etc. Many software issues
are caused, and are magnified, by these interventions.
Modifications can be limited in expressiveness, such as
only allowing rule deletion.
• Resource modification: Even if the parameters or code
are not modified, the resources of the system and other
dependencies previously mentioned can be limited exter-
nally, e.g., the computational resources.
On the other hand, systems can modify themselves (inter-
nally). There are many varieties here too:
1. No self-modification, no memory: The system has no
memory, and works as being reset for any new input or
interaction. Many functional systems (mapping inputs to
outputs) are of this kind. Note, however, that the environ-
ment does have memory, so some systems, such as a vi-
sion system or a non-cognitive robot, can be affected by
the past and become a truly cognitive system.
2. Partially self-modifying: The algorithms in the learner or
solver cannot be modified but its data or knowledge (in
the form of learned weights or rules) can be modified by
a general algorithm, which is fixed. Many learning sys-
tems are of this kind, if the system has both a learning
algorithm and one or more learned models.
3. Totally self-modifying: The system can modify any part
of its code. Not many operational systems have these abil-
ities, as they become very unstable. However, some types
of evolutionary computation may have this possibility, if
evolution can also be applied to the rules of the evolution.
Finally, all these categories can be selected for different pe-
riods of time. For instance, it is common to separate between
training, test/validation and deployment. For training, a high
degree of self-modification (and hence adaptation) is well
accepted, but then this is usually constrained for validation
and deployment. Note that these stages apply for both exter-
nal and internal sources of modification. One important dan-
ger is that a well-validated system may be subject to some
late external or internal modification just before deployment.
In this case, all the validation effort may become void2.
One of the major modern concerns in AI safety is that it
will be desirable for some systems to learn during deploy-
2OpenAI Dota is an example: https://
blog.openai.com/the-international-2018-
results/, https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/
08/24/openai bots eliminated dota 2/
ment, in order for them to be adaptive3. For instance, many
personal assistants are learning from our actions continually.
While this may introduce many risks for more powerful sys-
tems, forbidding learning outside the lab would make many
potential applications of AI impossible. However, adaptive
systems are full of engineering problems; some must even
have a limited life, as after self-modification and adaptation
they may end up malfunctioning and have to be reset or have
their ‘caches’ erased. This problem has long been of interest
in engineering (Fickas and Feather 1995).
Types of motivation
Systems can follow a set of rules or aim at optimising a util-
ity function. Most systems are actually hybrid, as it is diffi-
cult to establish a crisp line between procedural algorithms
and optimisation algorithms. Through layers of abstraction
in these processes, we ultimately get the impression that a
system is more or less autonomous. If the system is appar-
ently pursuing a goal, what are the drivers that make a sys-
tem prefer or follow some behaviours over others? These
behaviours may be based on some kind of internal represen-
tation of a goal, as we discussed when dealing with antici-
pation, or on a metric of how close the system is to the goal.
Then the systems can follow an optimisation process that
tries to maximise some of these quality functions.
Quality or utility functions usually map inputs and out-
puts into some values that are re-evaluated periodically or
after certain events. Examples of these functions are accu-
racy, aggregated rewards or some kind of empowerment or
other types of intrinsic motivation (Klyubin, Polani, and Ne-
haniv 2005; Jung, Polani, and Stone 2011). The same system
might have several quality functions that can be opposed, so
trade-offs have to be chosen. The general notion of rational-
ity in decision-making is related to these motivations.
But what are the characteristics of the goals an AI system
can have in the first place? We outline several dimensions:
• Goal variability: Are goals hard-coded or change with
time? Do they change autonomously or through instruc-
tion? Who can change the goals and how? For instance,
what orders can a digital assistant take and from whom?
• Goal scrutability: Are the (sub)goals identifiable and ul-
timately explainable? Do they come from rules or are they
inferred from data, e.g., error in classification or observ-
ing humans in inverse reinforcement learning?
• Goal rationality: Are the goals amenable to treatment
within a rational choice framework? If several goals are
set, are they consistent? If not, how does the system re-
solve inconsistencies or set new goals?
Note that this is closely related to the types of modification,
as changing or resolving goals may require self-modification
and/or external modification.
3Nature has found many ways of regulating self-modification.
Many animals have a higher degree of plasticity at birth, becoming
more conservative and rigid in older stages (Gopnik et al. 2017).
One key question about cognition is whether this is a contingent or
necessary process, and whether it is influenced by safety issues.
A second question is how these goals are followed by the
system. There are at least three possible dimensions here:
• Immediateness: The system may maximise the function
for the present time or in the limit, or something in be-
tween. Many schemata of discounted rewards in rein-
forcement learning are used as trade-offs between short-
term and long-term maximisation.
• Selfishness: Focusing on individual optima might involve
very bad collective results (for other agents) or even re-
sults that could even be worse individually (tragedy of the
commons). Game theory provides many examples of this.
In multi-agent RL systems, rewards can depend on the
well-being of other agents, or empathy can be introduced.
• Conscientiousness: The system may be fully committed
to maximising the goal, or some random or exploratory
actions are allowed, even if they deviate occasionally from
the goal. When it is on purpose, this is usually intended
to provide robustness or to avoid local minima, but these
deviations can take the system to dangerous areas.
Modulating optimisation functions to be convex with a non-
asymptotic maximum, beyond which further effort is futile,
may be a sensible thing as it provides a stop condition by
definition. A self-imposed cap can always be shifted if ev-
erything is under control once the limit is reached.
Note that the kind of interaction seen before is key for
the internal quality metric or goal. For instance, in asyn-
chronous RL, “the time can be intentionally modulated by
the agent” to get higher rewards without really performing
better (Herna´ndez-Orallo 2010). And, of course, a common
problem for motivation is reward hacking.
Types of achievement
Ultimately, an AI system is conceived to achieve a task, in-
dependently of how well motivated the system is for it. Con-
sequently, the external degree of achievement must be dis-
tinguished from the motivation or quality metric the system
uses to function, as discussed in the previous subsection.
The misalignment between the internal goal of the system
and the task specification is the cause of many safety issues
in AI, unlike formal methods in software engineering, when
requirements are converted into correct code.
Focusing on the task specification, we must first recognise
that different actors may have different interests. A cognitive
assistant, for instance, may be understood by the user as be-
ing very helpful, making life easier. However, for the com-
pany selling the cognitive assistant, the task is ultimately to
produce revenue with the product. Both requirements are not
always compatible and this may affect the definition of the
goals of the system, as some of the aims may not be coded
or motivated in a transparent way, but usually incorporated
in indirect ways. Second, even if the requirements include
all possible internalities (what the system has to do), there
are also many externalities and footprints (Martı´nez-Plumed
et al. 2018a) (including the infinitely many things that the
system should not do) that affect how positive or negative its
overall effect is. Regarding these two issues, task specifica-
tion can vary in precision and objectivity:
• Task precision: The evaluation metric to determine the
success of an agent can be formal or not. For instance, the
accuracy of a classifier or the squared error of a regression
model are precisely defined metrics. However, in many
other cases, we have a utility function that depends on
variables that are usually imprecise or uncertain, such as
the quality of a smart vacuum cleaner.
• Task objectivity: A metric can be objective or subjective.
We tend to associate precise metrics with objectiveness
and imprecise metrics with subjectivity, but subjectivity
simply means that the evaluation changes depending on
the subject. For instance, the quality of a spam filter (a
precisely-evaluated classifier) changes depending on the
cost matrices of different users, and the quality of a smart
vacuum cleaner based on fuzzy variables such as cleanli-
ness or disruption can be weighted by a fixed formula.
Some of the tasks or targets that are most commonly ad-
vocated in the ethics and safety of AI literature are often
very imprecise and subjective, such as “well-being”, “social
good”, “beneficial AI”, “alignment”, etc. Note that the prob-
lem is not related to the goals of the system (an inverse rein-
forcement learning system can successfully identify the dif-
ferent wills of a group of people), but rather about whether
the task is ultimately achieved, or the well-being or hap-
piness of the user. Determining this is controversial, even
when analysed in a scientific way (Alexandrova 2017).
An overemphasis on tracking metrics (Goodhart’s law) is
sometimes blamed, but the alternative is not usually better.
Some safety problems are not created by an overemphasis
on a metric (Manheim and Garrabrant 2018), but ultimately
by a metric that is too narrow or shortsighted, and does not
adequately capture progress towards the goal.
In all these cases, we have to distinguish whether the met-
ric relates to (i) the internal goals that the system should
have, (ii) the external evaluation of task performance, or (iii)
our ultimate desires and objective4. Motivations, achieve-
ment and supervision are closely related, but may be dif-
ferent. For a maze, e.g., the goal for the AI system may be
to get out of the maze as soon as possible, but a competition
could be based on minimising the cells that are stepped more
than once, and supervision may include indications of direc-
tion to the shortest route to the exit. These are three different
criteria which may be well or poorly aligned.
Even more comprehensively – and related to the concept
of persistence –, a system may be analysed for a range of
tasks, under different replicability situations:
1. Disposable system: single task, single use: The system is
used for one task that only takes place once.
2. Repetitive system: single task, several uses: The system
must solve many instances of the same specific task.
3. Menu system: multitask: The system must solve different
tasks, under a fixed repertoire of tasks.
4Ortega et al (2018) distinguish between “ideal specification
(the ‘wishes’)” and “design specification”, which must be com-
pared with the revealed specification (the “behaviour”). The design
specification fails to distinguish external metric from internal goal.
4. General system: multitask: The system must solve differ-
ent tasks, without a fixed repertoire.
5. Incremental system: The system must solve a sequence of
tasks, with some dependencies between them.
Any metric examining the benefits and possible risks of a
system must take the factors described above into account.
Conclusion
Many accounts of AI safety focus on “either RL agents or
supervised learning systems” assuming “similar issues are
likely to arise for other kinds of AI systems” (Amodei et
al. 2016). This paper has surveyed a wide range of char-
acteristics of AI systems, so that future research can map
AI safety challenges against AI research paradigms in more
precise ways in order to ascertain whether particularly safety
challenges manifest similarly in different paradigms. This
aims to address an increasing concern that the current dom-
inant paradigm for a large proportion of AI safety research
may be too narrow: discrete-time RL systems with train/test
regimes, assuming gradient-based learning on a parametric
space, with a utility function that the system must optimise
(Gauthier 2018; Krakovna 2018).
Taxonomies of potentially safety-relevant characteristics
of AI systems, as introduced in this paper, are intended to
provide a good complement to recent work on taxonomies
of technical AI safety problems. For instance, Ortega (2018)
presents three main areas: specification, ensuring that an AI
system’s behaviour aligns with the operator’s true intentions;
robustness, ensuring that an AI system continues to operate
within safe limits upon perturbation, and assurance, ensur-
ing that we understand and control AI systems during oper-
ation. Almost all characteristics outlined in this paper have
a role to play for specification, robustness and assurance.
Taxonomies are rarely definitive, and the characterisation
presented here does not consider in full some quantitative
features such as performance, autonomy and generality. A
proper evaluation of how the kind and degree of intelligence
can affect safety issues is also an important area of analysis,
both theoretically (Herna´ndez-Orallo 2017) and experimen-
tally (Leike et al. 2017). AI research has explored different
paradigms in the past, and will continue to do so in the fu-
ture. Along the way, many different system characteristics
and design choices have been presented to developers. We
can expect even more to be developed as AI research pro-
gresses. Consequently, the area of AI safety must acquire
more structure and richness in how AI is characterised and
analysed, to provide tailored guidance for different contexts,
architectures and domains. There is a potential risk to over-
relying on our best current theories of AI when considering
AI safety. Instead, we aim to encourage a diverse set of per-
spectives, in order to anticipate and mitigate as many safety
concerns as possible.
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